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Abstract 
The  central  argument  defended  in  this  paper  is  made  up  of  two  interconnected 
statements: i) that a minimally defined rationality is an anthropological constant, being 
shared  by  all  conceivable  human  cultures;  and  ii)  that  this  “commonality  of  reason” 
constitutes the basis on which inter-cultural understanding is possible. In proving the first 
thesis (the universality of reason), the paper contrasts Western thought, epitomized in 
scientific reason, with non-Western thinking patterns, expressed by ethno-sciences, magic 
rituals, and other knowledge practices. The conclusion drawn from this comparison is 
that both modern scientific reason and non-literate peoples thought patterns are two 
“cognitive modes” sharing a strong structural similarity. Building on some loci classici of 
anthropological  literature  written  by  Malinowski,  Evans-Pritchard,  and  Lévi-Strauss 
(among others), the paper argues that although modern Western science and indigenous 
knowledge(s)  share  a  common  rational  denominator,  the  two  cognitive  modes  are 
nonetheless hierarchical, the former being epistemically superior to the latter thanks to 
its  unique  self-correcting  methodology.  The  paper  ends  by  arguing  the  case  for  the 
possibility of understanding the Other(s) by way of reason, a possibility grounded on the 
commonality of reason between cultures. 
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Introduction:  inter-cultural  hermeneutics  between  taken-for-grantedness  and 
incomprehensibility 
Until the “hermeneutic turn” that bent the trajectory of modern anthropology towards a 
postmodern destination, the possibility of understanding the Other remained amidst the 
stock of taken for granted assumptions, as part of the standard “of course answers” 
given if such a question was to be explicitly raised at all2. The dogmatic faith of the 
Enlightenment philosophy in the capacity of reason to fully understand the natural and 
social world neutralized any dubitative impulses of questioning the belief in the accuracy 
of the Western understanding of the colonized Other(s). The crisis of representation in 
the human sciences, announced by G.E. Marcus and M.M.J. Fischer (1986), opened the 
breaches through which the hermeneutic question erupted and imposed itself on top of 
anthropology’s agenda. In full tune with the emerging postmodern critique challenging 
the basic axioms of classical human sciences, the hermeneutic pendulum swung towards 
the pole of incomprehensibility. Enlightenment’s unbounded confidence in the power of 
reason to comprehend the Other had been abandoned and replaced by the postmodern 
hyperbolic mistrust regarding the possibility of “inter-cultural hermeneutics” (Ariarajah, 
2005; Marotta, 2009). 
In addition to the hermeneutic turn, the advent of relativism – first in its cultural 
mode, followed shortly by its more aggressive epistemological incarnation – threw doubt 
on the validity of “the rationality principle” in sociology and anthropology alike. Installed 
by  Max  Weber  as  canonical  methodological  rule,  the  rationality  principle  stated  that 
social scientists can understand and explain (Verstehen) social actions, social actors, and 
their  motives  of  action,  by  way  of  reason.  Founded  upon  this  principle,  Weberian 
Verstehen  sociology  asserts  that  “the  behavior  of  a  social  actor  is  always 
comprehensible”  (Boudon,  2005:  35).  The  principle  of  rationality,  coupled  with  the 
assumption  of  the  rationality  of  social  agents,  opened  the  doors  for  rationally 
comprehending  the  Others.  But  these  rational  doors  leading  to  understanding  were 
violently slammed by the cavalcade of “turns” breaking away with the Enlightenment’s 
trust in reason.  
Against  the  ideas  overstating  the  cultural  “incommensurability”  between 
different symbolic universes and the futility of reason in creating hermeneutic bridges 
connecting  these  allegedly  disjointed  and  self-contained  cultural  units,  this  paper 
defends the power of reason to pave the way towards understanding other cultures, 
however  different  in  their  cultural  manifestations.  This  paper  examines  “the 
commonality of reason” existing between different cultures, investigating the practical 
rationality  codified  in  the  ethno-sciences  and  other  magical  practices  developed  by 
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numerous non-industrial societies as being structurally similar to the type of rationality 
conventionally  described  as  the  hallmark  of  the  Western  world.  Highlighting  the 
universality of reason as an anthropological constant, this paper suggests that precisely 
this rational foundation shared by all human cultures is the premise that makes inter -
cultural understanding possible. 
One reason, two cognitive modes: reasoning in the scientific and ethno-scientific modes 
It is safe to affirm that any definition of science is “notoriously open to attack” (Goode, 
1959: 41). After the attempt of the Vienna Circle (logical positivist) philosophers to fix 
once  and  for  all  the  epistemological  formula  of  science  utterly  failed,  the  dream  of 
establishing an undisputable definition of what science is and how it is done has gone to 
the winds of relativism. In the aftermath of the collapse of logical positivism’s program of 
formalizing science (a collapse celebrated by P. Feyerabend in declaring that from now 
onwards  “anything  goes”),  a  plethora  of  definitions  of  science  bloomed  in  the  new 
context  of  epistemological  “anarchism”  (Feyerabend,  [1975]  1993:  14,  9).  However, 
despite the crumbling of the definitional consensus over “the soul of science,” every 
definitional pretendent must acknowledge that scientific thinking is inextricably linked to 
reason  and  that  science  is  a  codification  (however  imperfect)  of  rationality.  As  basic 
ingredient of science, the notion of rationality is itself an “essentially contested concept” 
(Gallie, 1956). Navigating between the extremes of putting forward a formal definition of 
rationality (which will almost certainly be just as expose to subsequent attacks) and of 
intuitively following the dictum “I know it when I see it,” I will make two assumptions: a) 
that an action can be qualified as rational if it is an efficient mean to an end, or if the 
acting agent can justify the action by resorting to a theory, ethic, or even to tradition (see 
Boudon, 2005: 40-52). (It goes without saying that I am using a “soft” or “thin” concept 
of rationality, not a “hard” or “broad” one similar to Pareto’s logical action [see Elster, 
1985: 1-33, for a discussion of thin versus broad theories of rationality]); b) that a belief or 
a system of beliefs is rational if it satisfies some criterion of rationality (Jarvie & Agassi, 
1967: 55). A minimal criterion of rationality can be accepted as provided by what A. Kukla 
(1991: 486) calls “passive acceptance,” which implies that “whenever we are apprised of 
an  incoherence  (i.e.,  an  inconsistency  or  a  lack  of  logical  closure)  in  our  system,  we 
should change our system in such a way as to eliminate it.” This can be contrasted to the 
maximal criterion of rationality, labeled by Kukla as “the criterion of logical omniscience” 
requiring a perfectly closed and logically coherent system. Given that the latter criterion 
of logical omniscience is too soliciting to be considered in the context of the lifeworld, 
the former criterion of passive acceptance will be used as the standard for rationality. 
This being said, I will argue that a thin conception of rationality is an anthropological 
constant characterizing all conceivable human cultural and actions systems. This will be 
shown by comparing  Western thought codified in science with non-Western thinking 
patterns expressed in ethno-sciences and magical practices. The contrast between the 
two cognitive modes will reveal that they share a basic rationality, although the scientific Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 1, Summer 2013 
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mode of thinking excel in epistemic terms in comparison to the native thought patterns 
due to a peculiar social institution and a self-correcting critical methodology. 
Science, as cultural phenomenon, social institution, and cognitive endeavor, is, 
arguably, historically unique to Western society. However, if it is true that science does 
not  require  a  “special  sense,”  such  as  J.  Bronowski  (1960:  11)  is  claiming,  then  the 
hypothesis  that  all  known  and  conceivable  human  cultures  had  developed  means  of 
knowledge similar to Western science gains plausibility. In R. Merton’s terms (1968: 88), 
it is to be expected that any human society, on the basis of their genetic commonality, to 
develop  “functional  alternatives”  to  modern  science,  epistemically  wanting,  but 
structurally similar surrogates to Western science. This issue, regarding modern science’s 
alleged epistemic pre-eminence over ethno-sciences must be clarified at once, in order to 
exonerate my position from any charges of ethnocentrism. Western thought is neither 
inherently superior to other patterns of thinking specific to non-industrial societies, nor 
does  it  have  a  priori  pre-eminence  over  non-Western  cognitive  styles.  Both  Western 
thinking  and  its  non-Western  counterpart  use  the  same  cognitive  materials,  mental 
resources, and inferential procedures. What is epistemically superior is only the “peculiar 
social  institution”  of  modern  science  (Ziman,  2004:  4),  emerged  in  Western  society 
during the 17th century. For the first time in human history, a community of inquirers has 
been socially organized around the sole collective purpose of producing knowledge and 
understanding  nature  through  empirical  research  coupled  with  logico-mathematical 
reasoning.  In  its  quest  for  attaining  reliable  knowledge,  this  community  of  inquirers 
developed  a  self-correcting  methodology  (i.e.  devising  rules  for  gathering  data  and 
making logical inferences, norms of expressive clarity, protocols for ensuring replicability 
and internal validity, and a culture promoting mutual criticism) which was conducive to a 
series  of  highly  counter-intuitive  theoretical  breakthroughs  that  provided  great 
technological payoffs. This self-correcting methodology is the sole reason making the 
Western social institution of science to be “peculiar” in comparison to other institutions 
of knowledge. Western thought is just as exposed to cognitive biases as there are other 
thinking patterns. Scientific methodology, however, manages to limit the frequency of 
falling  for  these  cognitive  traps  (overgeneralization,  binary  thinking,  confusing 
correlation  for  causation,  etc.).  Using  a  conceptual  distinction  devised  by  E.E.  Evans-
Pritchard, the same idea can be put in the following terms: just because we (Westerners) 
explain rain by pointing out meteorological causes while they (non-Westerners) attribute 
rainfall to ghosts, for example, “is no evidence that our brains function differently from 
their brains. It does not show that we ‘think more logically’ than savages [sic!], at least 
not  if  this  expression  suggests  some  kind  of  hereditary  psychic  superiority”  (Evans-
Pritchard,  [1934]  1970:  48).  The  difference  lies  not  in  the  thought  process  (which  is 
identical to both Westerners and non-Westerners as both construct structurally similar 
causal models of explanation), but in what Evans-Pritchard calls “the social content of 
thought,” which is given by scientific methodology and magic respectively. 
Cultural  anthropology  has  studied  how  non-industrial  societies  (the  so-called 
“exotic”  societies,  or  pejoratively  named  “primitive”  cultures)  come  to  form  their 
systems  of  knowledge.  More  precisely,  in  their  studies  of  “indigenous  knowledge,”     Rusu  / Hermeneutics of reason … 
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anthropologists  focused  on  unraveling  the  logic  of  classification,  the  patterns  of 
categorization, and the principles of taxonomization used by non-industrial societies. In 
short, the stakes of much of cognitive anthropology are to understa nd the epistemic 
practices of non-industrial societies, i.e. to apprehend the practices through which native 
communities produce knowledge. A semantic synonym for “indigenous knowledge” is 
the notion of “ethno-science,” understood as “native science” (Cajete, 2000) articulated 
by autochthonous populations to solve the practical problems confronting them in their 
everyday  life  (classifying  plants:  ethno-botany;  taxonomizing  animals:  ethno-zoology; 
vernacular  medical  knowledge:  ethno-medicine,  etc.).  The  foundational  idea 
underpinning  the  entire  anthropological  research  program  of  ethno-science  is  that 
indigenous  populations  possess  knowledge  structured  similarly  to  that  of  modern 
science (although obviously rudimentary in comparison with the latter), practicing one 
form or another of a native “science” that contributes to their adaptation to their natural 
environment. 
Ethno-sciences  have  much  of  the  basic  ingredients  of  modern  science 
(categorization, taxonomization, internal consistency, systematicity, etc.). This is due to 
the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  mental  faculties  which  are  prerequisites  for  doing 
science are part and parcel of human nature itself. Categorization, for instance, as basic 
process underpinning taxonomization, is a cognitive given. The entire cognitive system is 
wired up in such a way as to make the process of categorization a mental necessity. 
Hence, categorization is a basic rule governing the functioning of the mind. Of course, 
how reality is being carved up by categorization is relative to individuals and cultures 
(Whorf,  1956),  but  the  cognitive  process  itself  is  universally  shared,  being  in  fact  an 
anthropological constant. Beneath the bewildering plethora of cultural diversity, there 
nonetheless  exist  some  cognitive  universals  (categorization  being  one  of  these)  that 
make inter-cultural understanding possible. 
The  anthropology  of  science  raised  the  problem  of  the  relationship  between 
scientific rationality specific to Western modernity and thought patterns prevailing in 
various non-industrial communities. Against the traditional separatist school of thought 
seeing them as totally apart from each other, the conception that recognizes the quasi-
identity  of  structure  between  the  modern  scientific  thought  and  its  non-Western 
counterpart gained increasingly currency in recent scholarship. This paper is written from 
within  this  intellectual  tradition,  embracing  the  belief  that  both  modern  scientific 
rationality  and  pre-modern  patterns  of  thought  derive  from  the  same  root  of  basic 
rationality shared by all human beings. 
In the beginning of the 20th century, dominated by both the evolutionist outlook 
and  the  Western  arrogance,  anthropology  promoted  the  idea  of  the  categorical 
superiority  of  modern  society’s  pattern  of  thought  over  traditional  thinking.  This 
conclusion  was  further  fuelled  by  the  superficial  nature  of  research  dedicated  to 
understanding “savage” thought, a research program corrupted by the bankruptcy of 
the binary schema of civilized-primitive underpinning the early anthropological project. 
Representative for this stream of thought is Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1923), whose conception 
dichotomized, hierarchizing at the same time, the “pre-logical” thinking specific to the Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 1, Summer 2013 
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“primitive mentality” of non-literate people and the “logical thinking” characteristic to 
Western  society.  However,  the  increasingly  frequent  and  deeper  anthropological 
incursions into the center of the symbolic systems developed by exotic cultures triggered 
a paradigm shift, as cultural analysts continued to discover significant formal similarities 
between the two cognitive thought patterns. 
Embryonic  elements  of  the  idea  of  structural  similarity  existing  between 
“primitive” thinking and Western thought can be found inside the very framework of 
evolutionist anthropology. Following the footsteps of A. Comte (1903) [1844] and his 
three-stage model of the evolution of history – from the theological stage, through the 
metaphysical one, towards the positive phase –, J.G. Frazer, in his famous The Golden 
Bough, advances a triptych pattern similar to Comte’s model, in which the system of 
beliefs successively passes through the periods of a) primitive magic, b) religion, and c) 
science.  Within  the  framework  of  this  sequentialist  paradigm,  Frazer  argues  that  the 
magic practices and rituals of our forebears “were not willful extravagances, the ravings 
of insanity, but simply hypotheses, justifiable at the time when they were propounded, 
but which fuller experience has proved to be inadequate” (Frazer, cf. Phillips, 2007: 83). 
According to Frazer’s interpretation, the ritual practices developed by indigenous or non-
literate populations are “proto-hypotheses,” and the system of magic beliefs contains in 
nuce the “first blind and grasping strivings of an embryonic science” (Phillips, 2007: 83, my 
emphasis).  Frazer’s  evolutionist  paradigm  based  on  a  teleological  three-stage  linear 
movement  from  magic,  through  religion,  towards  science,  turned  out  to  be  a  gross 
simplification, as it was, inappellable, refuted in the court of 20th century anthropological 
scholarship.  Nonetheless,  the  fact  that  Fraser  claimed  that  there  was  a  kernel  of 
rationality to be found in the midst of “primitive magic” points out that the thesis of 
structural  similarity  between  “primitive”  and  Western  thought  patterns  had  some 
historical antecedents. Firmly rejecting his strict teleological evolutionism as unfounded 
(magical thought does not necessarily “evolve” into scientific thinking, as there still exist 
numerous  pockets  of  magical  practices  thriving  within  our  contemporary  “scientific 
society,” astrological practices being only one eloquent example), what can be retained 
from Fraser’s view is that even the most bizarre magical rituals to a Western eye contain 
a  grain  of  rationality.  Disemboweled  from  its  evolutionist  carcass,  this  thesis  will  be 
reclaimed and further elaborated by a series of famous anthropologists whose views on 
this subject will be discussed further. 
Rationality in the classical land of Magic: Malinowski and Melanesian ethno-science 
Bronislaw Malinowski was one of the major protagonists who overthrown the paradigm 
of  total  rupture  between  the  “primitive”  and  “civilized”  rationality,  pleading  for  the 
homology of structure between the two. Malinowski manifests an ambivalent attitude 
towards L. Lévy-Bruhl: on the one hand, he appreciates him as the first to turn scholars’ 
attention towards the primitive thinking in its “more sober moods” (Malinowski, 1948: 
8).  Until  him,  anthropologists  ignored  the  sober  component  of  native  thought, 
fascinated by its more exotic aspects, expressed in magic, religion, or mythology. On the     Rusu  / Hermeneutics of reason … 
 
 
69 
 
69 
other hand, by his corrupted conclusions (that the primitive man is incapable of making 
impartial observations, unbiased by his own subjectivity and wishful thinking; that he has 
no ability to abstract reasoning, towards which he manifests a visceral aversion; that he is 
incapable to form or understand ideas such as the cause -effect relation or those of 
identity and contradiction; that his entire thinking is pre-logical and mystical through and 
through), Lévy-Bruhl has established the dogma of the “primitive’s man irrationality” in 
anthropology (Malinowski, 1948: 9).3 
Blustering  against  the  anthropological  dogma  enshrined  by  Lévy -Bruhl, 
Malinowski counters by elaborating the thesis that scien ce, however rudimentary, is a 
cultural universal. Just as there are no known human societies without magic and 
religion, “nor are there, it must be added at once, any savage races lacking either in the 
scientific attitude or in science” (Malinowski, 1948: 1). Following the Durkheim of The 
Elementary  Forms  of  the  Religious  Life  (1976)  [1912],  Malinowski  described  human 
experience in society as being in every culture divided in two clearly defined and “non-
overlapping magisteria” (Gould, 1997): The Sacred and The Profane. Magic and religion 
have  jurisdiction  over  the  sacred  domain,  while  science  (or  its  crude  indigenous 
equivalent) claims tutelage over the profane areal of social life. The binary categorization 
of reality in the two separate experiential zones also entails the autonomy of each of 
them against the interference of the other. Hence, although the system of beliefs held by 
the Melanesians studied by Malinowski had a significant supernatural dimension, this was 
being doubled by a prosaic dimension made up of mundane knowledge used in practical 
purposes, whose efficiency in the everyday affairs depended upon the non-interference 
of mystical beliefs. For instance, in the construction of canoes, the Melanesians do not 
resort to magical incantations or invoke supernatural blessings (i.e. sacred knowledge), 
but rely entirely on technical know-how (i.e. profane knowledge). Magic does not intrude 
within the realm of practical knowledge, as Melanesians are in possession of efficient 
means of constructing efficient boats in terms of speed as well as stability and safety. 
Moreover,  the  autonomy  of  profane  technical  knowledge  of  this  type  in  regards  to 
mystical notions is also proved by the fact that magical beliefs and rituals are developed 
as  spiritual  addendum  to  the  non-mystical  one  only  when  the  situation  is  uncertain 
enough  as  to  cannot  be  controlled  exclusively  by  mundane  means  (technical  or 
conceptual). Malinowski buttresses his thesis that magical conceptions derive from the 
moments of crisis and uncertainty by invoking a concrete illustrative practice: fishermen 
who  are  fishing  in  the  shallow  waters  along  the  coastal  line  do  not  envelop  their 
practices in magical rituals, while fishermen venturing into the high seas of dangerous 
waters equip themselves, alongside the absolutely necessary practical knowledge, with 
additional magical devises. 
                                                        
3 Another built-in flaw of early 20th century anthropology had been its gender bias. The equation or total 
identification of “human being” with “man” pervades the writings and thinking of early anthropologists. 
Fully aware of this gender bias, I chose to keep it as such in my discussion of Lévy-Bruhl and Malinowski, 
wishing to remain faithful to the authors’ (mis)conception. Correcting their gender bias would mean to 
engage in an act of retrospective justice that would deform their views on social world. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 1, Summer 2013 
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The intensive study of the Melanesian system of beliefs and practices, carried out 
in “the classical land of magic, Melanesia” (Malinowski, 1948: 15), has led Malinowski to a 
double finding: a) at the individual level, primitive man is a competent knower, a keen 
observer of his environment, endowed with the ability of abstract reasoning; b) at the 
collective level, “every primitive community is in possession of a considerable store of 
knowledge, based on experience and fashioned by reason” (Malinowski, 1948: 9). The 
remaining  question  was  if  this  practically  efficient  indigenous  knowledge  also  has 
theoretical  value,  or,  conversely,  if  it  is  only  an  archive  of  practical  rules  of  thumbs, 
nothing but “crude empiry.” In the same train of questioning thought, can indigenous 
knowledge be seen as a rudimentary stage of science, sharing with modern science a 
common  methodological  infrastructure?  Malinowski’s  answer  is  a  categorical  yes. 
“Primitive” knowledge contains the rudiments of modern science, while practical reason 
underpinning indigenous thought and Western reason share a common denominator. 
The  attempt  to  fix  science  in  an  uncontroversial  definition  is  of  notorious 
difficulty.  Many  professional  epistemologists  have  surrendered  to  this  definitional 
touchstone. Malinowski, although not a professional epistemologist, does not share their 
fate. Depending on how demanding is science defined, indigenous knowledge comes 
closer or moves farther away from the requirements of modern science. Malinowski’s 
bold  argument  is  that  the  distance  between  the  two  is  not  going  to  be  too  wide, 
irrespective  of  how  much  one  raises  the  bar.  According  to  a  “minimum  definition”4 
(Malinowski,  1948:  17),  scientific  knowledge  can  be  understood  as  satisfying  the 
following set of requirements: 
a)  the  exigency  of  systematicity,  which  implies  the  existence  of  an  internally 
integrated and unitary body of rules and conceptions; 
b)  the  exigency  of  the  logical-empirical  foundation:  the  body  of  rules  and 
conceptions must be supported by experience and derived from it by way of 
logical inference; 
c)  the exigency of artifactuality, which demands that the system of knowledge to 
can be incorporated in material achievements, i.e. to produce artifacts; 
d)  the exigency of rigidity: the set of rules and conceptions must be fixed into a 
form of tradition in order to ensure its temporal durability and perpetuation; 
e)  the exigency of social organization, which requires that the cognitive activity to 
have a collective nature, so that the process of knowledge production to be 
carried out within the frameworks of a social organization. 
Defining science by these five features, Malinowski’s (1948: 17) next move is to 
force the conclusion that “there is no doubt that even the lowest savage communities 
have the beginnings of science, however rudimentary.” Against Malinowski’s expressed 
certainty that any social collectivity must possess a kind of rudimentary science, it would 
be  safer  to  keep  a  precautious  doubt,  since  Malinowski  seems  to  fall  in  the  same 
                                                        
4 Malinowski (1948: 17) defines science as “a body of rules and conceptions, based on experience and 
derived from it by logical inference, embodied in material achievements and in a fixed form of tradition and 
carried on by some sort of social organization.”     Rusu  / Hermeneutics of reason … 
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teleological-evolutionistic trap that Fraser had fell into before him. Instead of speaking of 
“the beginning of science,” the same idea could have been better expressed in terms of 
“basic socio-cognitive prerequisites” shared by both Western society and pre-industrial 
communities.  But  besides  these  problematic  issues  (which  can  be  surpassed  by 
converting  them  in  a  non-teleological  language),  Malinowski’s  statement  is  putting 
forward a strong case for the thesis of structural similarity defended in this paper. But 
Malinowski  is  not  entirely  satisfied  with  this  conclusion  by  which  he  has  already 
rehabilitated the cognitive status of indigenous knowledge. Progressively, Malinowski 
raises the stakes substantially, by adding additional epistemological requirements to this 
minimum definition of science. Thus, anticipating the possible objection against such a 
loose definition of science, Malinowski overbids by inserting an extra clause: 
a)  the  cognitive  exigency,  which  demands  that  scientific  knowledge  must 
decisively  surpass  the  pragmatic  level  of  technical  thinking  and  contain 
general theoretical principles. In Malinowski’s words (1948: 17), the corpus of 
methods and conceptions “must not only be rules of practical behavior, but 
theoretical laws of knowledge.”  
Even with this additional requirement in place, Malinowski argues that primitive 
knowledge satisfies all the exigencies of science, since the former contains numerous 
abstract  principles  (e.g.  general  laws  of  hydrodynamics  and  equilibrium  that  the 
Melanesians  must  be  aware  of  in  building  their  canoes).  This  is  where  Malinowski’s 
argument falls short. Malinowski is at pains to prove that Melanesians master theoretical 
principles, i.e. that they fully understand the forces of nature, although they lack the 
vocabulary  that  would  permit  them  to  make  these  principles  explicit  as  in  Western 
science.  Ultimately,  despite  Malinowski’s  argumentative  struggle,  his  case  for  the 
abstract  theoretical  nature  of  Melanesian  knowledge  is  unconvincing.  Technical 
efficiency  and  pragmatic  mastery  of  some  realms  of  the  natural  world  does  not 
necessarily imply abstract theoretical understanding. But Malinowski does not stop here. 
Raising  the  stakes  once  again,  Malinowski  inserts  what  he  names  to  be  “the  really 
scientific attitude” (1948: 18), consisting in: 
b)  the  exigency  of  disinterestedness:  knowledge  for  knowledge’s  sake,  whose 
motivation is of intrinsic nature and not of pragmatic or instrumental reasons. 
This  last  criterion  could  seem  to  be  finally  too  demanding  for  indigenous 
knowledge. Malinowski acknowledges that no “primitive” culture is characterized by a 
genuine thirst of disinterested knowledge, but by making this concession he is not yet 
ready to abandon his position. Despite this deficit, Malinowski points out three types of 
individuals  who  come  close  to  satisfying  the  exigency  of  disinterested  knowledge, 
painting their intellectual portraits with a few broad strokes: i) the antiquarian mind, to 
be  found  in  the  fascinated  collector  of  myths,  customs,  genealogies,  and  historical 
legends; ii) the naturalist, in the person of the keen observer and intimate knower of 
nature: iii) the “sociologist,” that subtle and cultivated expert in the human affairs of his 
fellows,  who  understands  the  functioning  mechanisms  of  social  order  and  human 
institutions. About the latter, who possess a “second order common sense” (Chelcea, 
2001:  22),  Malinowski  (1948:  18)  says  that  he  is  the  “ideal  informant”  for  the Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 1, Summer 2013 
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anthropologist  who  struggles  to  familiarize  himself  or  herself  with  the  sociocultural 
system  s/he  wishes  to  understand.  Malinowski’s  conclusion  is  that  primitive  science, 
however  “crude,  rudimentary,  and  inchoate,”  is  nonetheless  “the  matrix  from  which 
higher developments must have sprung” (Malinowski, 1948: 18). 
Shrouded in magic: rationality in the Azande mode 
The Melanesians studied by Malinowski kept apart the sphere of the supernatural from 
the sphere of the mundane, preventing thus from mixing together the magic and the 
prosaic. Malinowski is at pains to compel us to accept his argument that in the profane 
businesses of everyday life, the indigenous people base their actions upon a system of 
knowledge that approximates (although with large shortcomings and deficiencies) the 
knowledge system of modern science. In contrast, the Azande people studied by E.E. 
Evans-Pritchard (1976) [1937] seem to amalgamate the two spheres, closely intertwining 
them in their conception of the omnipresence of witchcraft in their everyday lives. The 
belief that witchcraft has a ubiquitous nature in their daily affairs holds a central position 
within the Azande belief-system. For instance, diseases affecting people are attributed to 
witchcrafts done by persons of the same sex with the diseased. Azande people firmly 
believe that witchcraft has a concrete reality, the power of witchcraft being thought to 
derive from a biological basis. The “substance of witchcraft” resides in the organism of 
the  person  possessing  these  magical  powers,  more  precisely,  being  localized  “just 
beneath the xiphoid cartilage,” as Evans-Pritchard (1976: 2) concluded after inquiring the 
locals. “It is attached to the edge of the liver. When people cut open the belly they have 
only to pierce it and witchcraft-substance bursts through with a pop,” said one of the 
natives (ibidem). The Azande belief-system is supported, beside this somatic principle, by 
a second central axis in the hereditary principle, according to which witchcraft is inherited 
along sexual lines (mothers pass on the witchcraft-substance to their daughters, while 
fathers pass it on to their sons). Cross inheritance (from father to  daughter or from 
mother  to  son)  is  inconceivable  to  the  Azande  mind.  In  detecting  the  author  of  the 
witchcraft,  the  sick  person  consults  the  benge,  a  ritual  practice  translated  by  Evans-
Pritchard as “poison oracle.” The Zande individual afflicted by witchcraft administers a 
standard dose of poison to a fowl. If the fowl dies after the name of the suspect has been 
pronounced, it is thought that the named person is indeed the author of the witchcraft. 
If the fowl survives the poison, the named suspect is exonerated. 
What  relevance  could  have  these  beliefs  of  the  Azande  people  regarding 
witchcraft for the argument defended in this paper, namely that “primitive” thought is 
structurally similar to Western thinking epitomized by “the scientific outlook” (Russell, 
1954)? At first sight, the mere mentioning of the belief in witchcraft, the corporality of 
the  witchcraft,  and  the  hereditary  rules  of  transmitting  it  seems  to  be  enough  to 
demolish the argument defended here. The situation takes a dramatic turn if we analyze 
the corpus of beliefs held by Azande people from an emic perspective (i.e. by taking an 
inside view from within the belief-system) (Iluț, 1997: 38). The change occurs because, 
despite  the  profound  supernatural  character  of  the  Azande  beliefs,  the  system  itself     Rusu  / Hermeneutics of reason … 
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presents  two  surprising  features:  a)  it  contains  a  quasi-experimental  element,  being 
equipped with means of empirical verification of the predictions made by the poison 
oracle, and b) it is internally logical welded, espousing a flawless, perfectly closed, and 
tautological consistency. 
Embedded in Azande thought system is a quasi-experimental element, to which 
natives  resort  in  order  to  check  and  validate  the  oracle’s  prediction.  What  must  be 
emphasized is that the natives do not give absolute authority to the predictions made by 
the  poison  oracle.  Their  belief-system,  whose  structure  of  resistance  is  made  of  the 
somatic  principle  (the  witchcraft-substance  is  bodily  located)  and  the  inheritance 
principle (the witchcraft-substance is genetically passed on along sexual lines), allows for 
the empirical testing of the predictions derived from the oracle’s results. Due to this fact, 
Azande people resort to two verification strategies: a) empirical research conducted by 
carrying out autopsies on the corpse of the named suspect confirmed by the poison 
oracle  after  natural  death  has  occurred;  b)  logical  inferences  based  on  kinship 
relationships, by which they conclude if a person is a witch depending on the witch-
status of his or her parent. However, the most interesting verification procedure is post-
mortem examination. Evans-Pritchard (1976: 16) describes the activities carried out in the 
following terms: 
An autopsy is performed in public at the edge of the grave. Those who attend are 
relatives of the dead, his relatives-in-law, his friends, his blood-brothers, and old men 
of standing in the neighbourhood who commonly attend funerals and sit watching 
the grave-diggers at their labour and other preparations for burial. Many of these old 
men have been present on similar occasions in the past, and it is they who will decide 
upon the presence or absence of witchcraft-substance. They can tell its presence by 
the way the intestines come out of the belly. 
It follows from Evans-Pritchard’s description that the procedure for determining 
the  diagnosis  is  public.  The  public  nature  of  the  process  of  witchcraft  determination 
shares  significant  elements  with  the  publicity  of  modern  science  (Merton,  1973). 
Moreover, the persons establishing the final diagnosis are individuals who hold expertise 
acquired  through  experience.  Having  another  correspondent  in  modern  science,  the 
decision makers are those who possess fact-finding competence. In this way, the oracle’s 
predictions are continuously verified, as they are never taken for granted as apodictic 
sentences issued by a supreme authority. 
The  quasi-experimental  component  embedded  in  the  Azande  method  is  also 
revealed by the manner in which natives prepare the ground for the oracle ritual to take 
place. After they collect the poison from the forest, the natives test its efficiency as 
preliminary  measure  of  validating  the  “oracular  methodology.”  Before  officially 
beginning the benge ritual, the locals administer poison to a fowl to test its killing effects. 
If the fowl survives, they continue to administer the poison to a second, or a third fowl, 
until eventually one of them dies. This empirical result (i.e. the death of the fowl) proves 
that the poison works. If no fowl dies, the Azande people draw the conclusion that the 
poison is corrupt, causing the oracle not to function correctly. If the poison has no effect, Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 1, Summer 2013 
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or if the poison is too strong, killing non-discriminatively all fowl, “the oracle would then 
be a farce” (Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 158), and the Azande people are fully aware of this. All 
these methodological precautions taken to ensure the “internal validity” of the oracle’s 
predictions indicate that “Azande [people] act experimentally within the framework of 
their mystical notions” (ibidem). 
The same quasi-scientific procedures similar to modern science’s methodology are 
revealed by the ethno-medicine developed by the Azande people. The medicines are 
used by the method of “trial and error” (Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 196), which implies that if 
a drug has no notable effect on the condition of the sick person, it is changed with 
another drug, in an attempt to alleviate the pain by replacing the medical cure. Evans-
Pritchard noted that the medical thinking of the Azande does more than to just operate 
by trial and error: diseases are not just diagnosed, but also prognosed. The diseases’ 
evolution is being forecasted, the causes for each type of disease are being determined, 
and specific treatment schedules are given to each disease. In administering treatment, 
this is most often selected based on prior experience, although special cases can  be 
managed by applying an experimental logic. If we accept K. Popper’s epistemological 
vision, according to which the method of science is “the method of trial and error,” that 
of “conjectures and refutations” (Popper, 1979), then it becomes clear that between the 
operational logic of the Azande and the scientists’ method of doing research there is a 
strong structural analogy.  
The second surprising feature characterizing Azande thought system (apart from 
the “quasi-experimental element” already pointed out) is its tight internal coherence. In 
this regard, Evans-Pritchard (1976: 16) insists that “the Zande mind is logical and inquiring 
within the framework of its culture and insists on the coherence of its own idiom.” The 
Azande system’s internal coherence is revealed by the situations when the oracle fails, 
i.e.  when  the  oracle  makes  contradictory  predictions.  For  an  oracular  verdict  to  be 
considered  valid,  the  poison  must  kill  one  fowl  (after  the  suspect’s  name  has  been 
pronounced)  and  spare  another  (after  the  name  of  another  suspect  has  been  put 
forward). It is a defect inherent to the oracular method that sometimes both of the fowls 
die,  thus  making  the  oracle  to  contradict  itself.  But  Azande  thought  managed  to 
rationalize this outcome and to escape from drawing the conclusion establishing the 
oracle’s  self-contradiction  by  resorting  to  what  Evans-Pritchard  (1976:  155)  has  called 
“secondary  elaborations  of  belief”  through  which  the  oracle  is  exonerated  from  the 
possibility of self-contradiction. Azande developed a whole series of this kind of “post 
hoc justifications” by which contradictions observed at the level of factual experience 
are being  (dis)solved at the superior level of  theoretical interpretation. For  example, 
Azande people can invoke the breaching of a taboo, the wrong variety or the old age of 
the poison, or even the anger of the ghosts as justifying devices explaining the oracle’s 
contradictory  outcomes.  Adding  secondary  rationalizing  beliefs  that  justify  factual 
contradictions gives to Azande thought systemic coherence. If we accept the criterion of 
internal consistency as a minimal requirement of rationality, then Azande belief system 
can be credited as espousing a holistic rationality.     Rusu  / Hermeneutics of reason … 
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However, it must be neither forgotten nor understated the  crucial differences 
between  the  two  cognitive  modes.  Although  modern  science  shares  structural 
similitudes with ethno-sciences practiced by non-literate peoples, the former does not 
identify with the latter, nor is it dissolvable into or reducible to indig enous knowledge. 
Evans-Pritchard is fully aware of both science’s epistemological superiority and Azande 
belief-system’s intrinsic deficiencies. After he takes note of the intellectual coherence of 
the Azande thought, Evans-Pritchard (1976: 150) unveils its other facet: Azande notions 
“are so ordered that they never too crudely contradict sensory experience but, instead, 
experience seems to justify them.” This indicates that the Azande belief-system equipped 
itself with anti-falsificationist strategies, in the sense that it has built-in defense devices 
protecting  the  system  against  the  risks  of  empirical  refutation.  This  is  the  clearest 
symptom  of  pseudo-science  diagnosed  by  K.  Popper  (1992)  [1934],  representing  the 
cardinal sin of any doctrine of thought claiming scientific status. Of course, no one is 
saying  that  the  Azande  belief-system  claims  such  epistemological  aspirations,  but 
nonetheless,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  system  has  armored  itself  with  immunizing 
mechanisms against the possibility of empirical falsification. Azande people “observe the 
action  of  the  poison  oracle  as  we  observe  it,  but  their  observations  are  always 
subordinated to their beliefs and are incorporated into their beliefs and made to explain 
them and justify them” (Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 150). In other words, the natives collect 
the same observational data as any other external observer, but the theoretical frame in 
terms of which these data are being interpreted gives them meanings that reinforce the 
very  theoretical  framework.  Azande  theoretical  expectations  not  only  subordinate 
experience,  but  even  somewhat  perversely  transform  it  into  empirical  buttresses  to 
further  support  the  theoretical  framework.  In  its  turn,  science  is  not  free  of  similar 
characterizations. In the philosophy of science, the code name for this is “the theory-
ladenness of observation” (Brewer and Lambert, 2001), according to which empirical 
data are inescapably influenced by the theoretical framework in terms of which they are 
collected and made sense of. Although undeniably valid, the argument of “the theory-
ladenness of observation” comes in various degrees and strengths. Science’s superiority 
in comparison to Azande thought-system resides in that the former is much less affected 
by theory-ladenness that the latter, whose conclusions are completely colored by the 
theoretical  premises.  As  W.F.  Brewer  and  B.L.  Lambert  (2001:  S176)  conclude,  “the 
evidence  for  theory-ladenness  does  not  lead  to  a  relativist  account  of  scientific 
knowledge.” 
Azande belief-system is thus wrapped around multiple safety belts protecting the 
system against direct empirical refutation. A similar point, concerning scientific “research 
programs,” has been made by the philosopher of science I. Lakatos (1978). In his view, 
every scientific theory is made up of two elements: a hard core, containing the central 
assumptions of the theory, and auxiliary hypotheses protectively enveloping the hard 
core. The central assumptions of the theory cannot be directly tested against reality, 
since only the auxiliary elements are confronted against experience. But again, as in the 
case of the theory-ladenness of both scientific and Azande belief-systems, similarity does 
not mean putting the equal sign between science and magic beliefs. As the history of Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 1, Summer 2013 
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science so eloquently demonstrates, tenacious theories can be eventually discarded by 
reason  and  observation  (e.g.  Ptolemy’s  geocentric  view  of  the  universe,  Aristotle’s 
theory of spontaneous generation, or Joseph Priestley’s phlogiston theory), while magic 
beliefs (such as the Azande poison oracle) are much harder to shake. They die not by 
rational-empirical  refutation  as  scientific  theories  do  in  the  long  term,  but  with  the 
disappearance  of  the  culture  embodying  them,  or  swept  away  by  other  extrinsic 
developments, such as cultural calamities or accelerated sociocultural change. 
Evans-Pritchard (1976: 159) is led to conclude that the Azande blindness towards 
the  oracles,  preventing  them  from  seeing  that  the  oracles  do  not  tell  them  nothing 
reliable, “is not due to stupidity: they reason excellently in the idiom of their beliefs, but 
they cannot reason outside, or against, their beliefs because they have no other idiom in 
which to express their thoughts.” In contrast to the natives, the British anthropologist is 
being in the position to detect that the Azande faith in the institution of the poison 
oracle is “without foundations” (ibidem), due to the fact that he disposes of the superior 
language of science in which he can translate and evaluate the validity of the truth-claims 
made  by  the  oracular  predictions.  Science,  although  itself  another  “idiom,”  can  be 
regarded in fact as a meta-language within whose framework all the other languages 
generating truth-claims (including indigenous knowledge) can be evaluated. Of course, a 
series of questions pop up immediately: how can the “meta-language status” of science 
be justified? What makes the language of science the yardstick for all the other idioms 
producing truth-claims? 
This sort of highly provocative epistemological questions had been critically raised 
by P. Winch (1964) in his attack of what he accused to be an ethnocentric bias from the 
part  of  Evans-Pritchard.  These  allegations  were  formulated  against  Evans-Pritchard’s 
conclusion that “we” (i.e. Westerners possessing scientific knowledge) know better than 
“them” (the Azande) that witches do not actually exist. Winch’s critique sparked what 
later developed into the “debate over rationality” in human sciences and philosophy. 
Following closely the philosophical trail of his master – the late L. Wittgenstein (1953) of 
Philosophical  Investigations  –,  Winch  argued  that  Western  science  and  Azande  magic 
must be understood as “language games,” played in two particular “forms of life.” Since 
each  of  them  have  its  own  grammar  of  rules,  epistemic  norms,  and  criteria  of 
adjudicating  truth-claims,  Western  science  and  Azande  magic  are  thus  different  but 
unrankable systems of belief and practice. Judging the sentences of one language game 
in terms of the other is a mistake, argued Winch, and in Evan-Prichard’s case it revealed 
an ethnocentric attitude. Or, with a Kuhnian twist, the same idea can be cast in the 
following  expressive  mold:  Azande  system  of  thought  and  Western  science  are  two 
incommensurable  paradigms.  Irrespective  of  the  terminology  used  to  describe  the 
situation,  Winch  (1964:  313)  presses  the  same  intellectual  charges  against  Evans-
Pritchard, accusing him of wrongfully concluding that “our concept of reality is correct, 
the Azande are mistaken.” But is Winch right to say that Azande culture is a “form of life” 
alien to the Western one, which can be understood only in its own terms and internal 
categories? Can Evans-Pritchard be legitimately accused of making a “category mistake” 
by evaluating Azande truth-claims in the framework of science? Regarding the first issue,     Rusu  / Hermeneutics of reason … 
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the basic rationality of Azande belief system suggests that Azande culture is not so 
different from our Western society, and thus it is far from being incomprehensible in 
Western terms. Precisely the commonality of reason shared by both cultures (Azande 
and Western societies) suggests that they are not the incommensurable self -contained 
cultural units that Winch is portraying them to be. Secondly, does Evans-Pritchard make 
an abusive judgment by evaluating Azande beliefs in his scientific framework? I believe he 
is  not.  As  a  British  anthropologist  socialized  in  Western  scientific  tradition,  he  can 
understand  an  alien  culture  only  by  translating  it  into  his  familiar  framework  of 
categories. Once translated, he cannot but evaluate its truth-claims against the criteria of 
truth inherent to his frame of reference, i.e. the scientific one. Now, how can this be 
justified? It seems to me that science, understood as a cognitive instrument progressively 
perfected by detecting and eliminating its own cognitive biases, provides the best frame 
of reference for evaluating the validity of truth -claims. What make science the most 
reliable  framework  or  language  for  judging  truth -claims  are  precisely  its  specific 
characteristics:  it  is  anti-authoritarian  and  critically  orientated,  features  that  make  it 
highly aversive to dogma; it is also reflexive regarding its own assumptions, submitting 
from time to time its whole network of presuppositions to severe “epistemic revisions”; 
it  has  a  continuous  self-corrective  drive;  moreover,  it  is  culturally  inclusive  and  non-
discriminatory on any other criteria except for the quality of logical argumentation and 
empirical adequacy, etc. As I already mentioned earlier, science’s epistemic secret lies in 
its self-correcting methodology, which gives it a decisive edge over all other systems of 
producing  knowledge  and  truth-claims.  Besides  this  methodological  argument,  a 
pragmatic reason can be added: science’s epistemic distinction is clearly expressed by its 
record  of  past  achievements,  successful  predictions,  and  parsimonious  explanations 
provided,  unmatched  by  any  other  rival  system.  Rooted  in  common  sense,  science 
progressively refined its methodological apparatus, protocols of establishing validity, and 
inference procedures, becoming in the course of time the best cognitive tool devise by 
humanity.  Without  entering  into  epistemological  subtleties,  suffice  is  to  highlight 
science’s  impressive  track  of  technological  accomplishments  (which  are  direct 
consequences of theoretical innovations) in order to certify its epistemic advantage. All 
these, I believe, make science the most efficient tool devised yet for judging truth-claims, 
therefore  epistemically  legitimizing  Evans-Pritchard  to  conclude  the  illusive  nature  of 
some of Azande beliefs. 
Cerebral savagery: Lévi-Strauss and the universal basic grammar of mental language 
Claude  Lévi-Strauss  (2004)  [1962]  completed  the  panoply  of  argumentative  weapons 
aiming  at  the  notion  of  rupture  between  the  indigenous  mind  and  Western  rational 
thought.  In  his  famous  work  titled  The  Savage  Mind,  Lévi-Strauss  rejects  the  thesis 
entrenched  in  anthropological  academic  culture  stating  the  non-literate  people’s 
incapacity  for  abstract  reasoning.  That  same  pre-conception  attacked  by  Lévi-Strauss 
promoted the idea that the conceptual systems developed by “savages” (i.e. the set of 
categories by which they carve out reality in order to make sense of it, and the taxonomy Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 1, Summer 2013 
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tables created to classify the world into genus, species, subspecies, and so forth) have no 
other  function except  a  purely  pragmatic -instrumental  one.  Lévi-Strauss  (2004:  9)  is 
struggling to dismantle this idea, arguing that, beyond responding to mere practical 
purposes,  building  such  conceptual  systems  is  firs t  and  foremost  determined  by 
“intellectual requirements.” Only an extra-pragmatic motivation, intellectual in nature, 
could explain why the American natives from the North East of USA and from Canada 
developed a “positive herpetology” (Lévi-Strauss, 2004: 8), classifying in a rigorous and 
systematic manner numerous species of reptiles despite the fact that these animals are 
practically  irrelevant  for  satisfying  the  needs  of  their  communities.  The  conceptual 
systems forged by “the savage mind” fulfill rather the function of cognitive ordering the 
universe  by  taxonomizing  it  in  terms  of  some  organizing  principles  that  ensure  the 
internal consistency of the system. Contra Lévy-Bruhl and his stadial conception (pre-
logical thinking as a prior stage of logical thought), Lévi-Strauss (2004: 13) concludes that 
mythical thinking is just as logically integrated as the system of science, both of them 
being  “two  parallel  modes  of  acquiring  knowledge,”  although  “their  theoretical  and 
practical results differ in value, for it is true that science is more successful than magic.” 
Formally, “primary” thinking (as Lévi-Strauss prefers to name it instead of “primitive” 
thinking)  operates  in  a  mode  similar  to  the  scientific  one,  since  it  implies  the  same 
sequence  of  methodical  observing  reality,  formulating  bold  conjectures,  followed  by 
rigorous testing them against the “tribunal of sense experience” (Quine, 1951: 38). The 
three-fold scheme consisting of observing-hypothesizing-testing explicitly assumed and 
deliberately  engaged in producing scientific knowledge is also present in guiding the 
process of indigenous knowledge, even though its presence is rather implicit. The fact 
that  the  Neolithic  man  possessed  technologies  such  as  agriculture,  domesticating 
animals, pottery, and metallurgy cannot be explained by appealing to the contingent and 
the fortuitous. Accidental, random, or passive discovery is highly implausible. According 
to Lévi-Strauss’ argument, the technological conquests of the Neolithic man could only 
be made if he possessed a “genuinely scientific attitude, sustained and watchful interest 
and a desire for knowledge for its own sake” (Lévi-Strauss, 2004: 14). Lévi-Strauss depicts 
the  indigenous  thinker  as  “the  cerebral  savage,”  who  shares  the  same  “universal 
grammar of the intellect” (Geertz, 1973: 345, 351). 
If we give credit to the conclusion drawn by W.V.O. Quine and J.S. Ullian (1978) 
that  systematicity  and  internal  consistency  are  the  hallmark  of  scientificity,  keeping 
knitted together science’s “web of belief,” it follows that mythical thinking fully satisfies 
the  two  desiderata.  Lévi-Strauss’  comparative  analysis  of  the  structures  of  mythical 
systems revealed the logical consistency of the classifying sets of rules used by non-
literate peoples. 
Arguing for the infrastructural unity between the two modes of thought (modern 
scientific science and native knowledge), Lévi-Strauss does not equate them. Far from 
finding  isomorphy  or  identity,  the  French  anthropologist  discovers  two  variations 
deriving from a common root. Using his famous technique of binary opposition (“the 
raw-and-the-cooked method”) developed for the structural analysis of mythical systems, 
the two cognitive modes can be presented in a head-to-head comparison:     Rusu  / Hermeneutics of reason … 
 
 
79 
 
79 
 
Table 1. Savage mind and scientific thought 
  “Savage mind”  Modern scientific thought 
Degree of abstractization  Science of the concrete  Science of the abstract 
Mode of approaching reality  Perceptual  Conceptual 
Procedural manner  Combinatory logic  Analytical methodology 
Human archetype  Bricoleur  Engineer 
Source: cf. Lévi-Strauss (2004: 1-33) 
 
Savage mind is compatible with “the science of the concrete,” having a much 
lower  degree  of  abstractization  in  comparison  to  its  scientific  counterpart.  This 
difference draws a line between indigenous thinking and scientific thought because the 
former approaches nature in terms of its sensible or secondary qualities (color, taste, 
smell,  sound),  while  the  latter  conceptualizes  nature  in  terms  of  its  primary  or  non-
sensible  qualities  (solidity,  extension,  motion,  number  and  figure).5  The non-literate 
knower operates in similar fashion to a  bricoleur who improvises solutions to practical 
problems by recycling, recombining, and permuting already existing elements. “Mythical 
thought  is  therefore  a  kind  of  intellectual  ‘bricolage’.”  (Lévi-Strauss,  2004:  17).  In 
contrast, the engineer is representative for the type of knower possessing a scientific 
mode of thinking. Unlike the bricoleur artisan, constrained by the limitation of his/her 
available tools to ingeniously improvise, the engineer has at his/her disposal both the 
liberty and the ability to invent, develop, or procure instruments fully optimized to match 
his/her needs and ends. 
Despite  its  epistemic  deficit  in  comparison  to  scientific  thought  pattern  (the 
latter, due to scientific methodology, being more careful to avoid the cognitive pitfalls 
lying ahead human thinking in general), “savage mind” is ultimately similar to scientific 
thinking,  implying  “comparable  intellectual  application  and  methods  of  observation” 
(Lévi-Strauss, 2004: 3). Without overstating, and thus risking jeopardizing the credibility 
of his argument, Lévi-Strauss acknowledges that mythical thinking is inferior to modern 
scientific thought; however, beside the specificities particularizing each of them, he also 
forcefully  argued  for  their  structural  similarity,  pointing  out  the  common  cognitive 
foundation shared by both scientific and mythical thought. 
Lévi-Strauss does not formulate an idiosyncratic opinion by stating that the same 
cognitive  structures  underpin  both  Western  secular  logic  and  non-scientific  mythical 
thought.  R.  Horton  (1967),  investigating  the  relationship  between  the  theoretical 
thinking prevailing in Western scientific culture and African thought, detected a basic 
communality as well as specific particularities. On the one side, the structural similarity 
between them consists in the pursuit of logical consistency, doubled by struggles to 
avoid internal contradictions. On the other hand, Horton points out the deficiencies and 
                                                        
5 The distinction between primary and secondary qualities has received its most thorough treatment in 
John Locke (1996: 49) [1689] in his philosophical locus classicus An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
see Book II “Of Ideas,” Chapter VIII, Sections 9-10 treating “Primary and secondary qualities.” Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 1, Summer 2013 
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limitations of African thought which establish its epistemic deficiency in comparison to its 
Western counterpart. In a synthetic formulation, African thought is undermined by the 
fact that it is “not reflective or critical, is closed rather than open, it is unable to entertain 
alternative conceptions to its dogma, it is ignorant of the experimental method and the 
concept of chance and it resorts to secondary rationalizations to protect its premises 
rather than face courageously the possibility of falsification” (Tambiah, 1990: 91). But 
even rendered in this way as a defective mode of thinking, African thought strangely 
resembles the modus operandi of “normal science” as described by T. Kuhn (1970). 
Reasonable conclusions: the hermeneutics of reason 
The discussion started in this paper can be brought to a close by concluding that the 
cognitive  struggles  of  making  sense  of  reality  constitute  a  human  universal,  or  an 
anthropological  constant  (Brown,  1991).  Although  modern  science  is  a  unique 
phenomenon to Western civilization, having a specific cultural genesis whose evolution 
has been strongly conditioned by the matrix of sociocultural forces particular to a certain 
historical epoch, its elements are nonetheless universal. It is true that scientific method 
has been progressively systematized and gradually refined over a long historical period, 
and emerged only in the European culture, but this does not make it a provincial product. 
It is provincial only in its genesis, universal in its possibilities. Any social system possesses 
the cognitive germs which make it a “science-capable society” (Gellner, 1984: 573). We 
know  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  thanks  to  extensive  anthropological  work,  that  any 
human collectivity is, paraphrasing Ernest Gellner, an “ethno-science-possessing society,” 
a characteristic illustrating the general human proclivity towards knowledge. Modern 
science and indigenous ethno-sciences are two stems growing out of the same cognitive 
root, which is the systematic propensity towards knowledge engraved in human nature. 
The contemporary modern scientist is but a variation (however, the most successful yet) 
of homo (ethno-)scientificus universalis. 
This  “commonality  of  reason”  between  cultures  shows  that  inter-cultural 
understanding is still possible, against the extreme relativistic allegations that cultural 
gaps  are  so  wide  that  they  cannot  be  crossed  by  rational  bridges.  The  thesis  of  the 
psychic unity of mankind, which is fully compatible with the empirical fact of cultural 
diversity, ensures the existence of certain “cognitive bridgeheads” between cultures that 
can  be  connected  through  reason.  Embodied  in  knowledge-practices  done  in  the 
“classical land Magic,” shrouded in oracular practices, or expressed by the bricolage of 
the “savage mind,” a minimally defined rationality can be discovered as underpinning all 
of  these  peculiar  activities.  As  shown  by  the  extensive  survey  of  some  classical 
anthropological works, basic ingredients of reason exist in all the systems of thought and 
practices  discussed  in  the  previous  pages.  Malinowski’s  Melanesians  developed  a 
“rudimentary  science”  structurally  similar  to  Western  science.  Both  cognitive  modes 
codified reason into highly efficient tools of mastering nature. Evans-Pritchard’s Azande 
developed  highly  sophisticated  systems  for  making  sense  of  the  world,  espousing 
important rational features (internal consistency and a quasi-experimental element). Not     Rusu  / Hermeneutics of reason … 
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least, Lévi-Strauss’ Amerindians developed a practically useless “positive herpetology” 
by using the tool of logical taxonomy. Some form of rationality seems to be “cognitive 
universals” that can be found in all human societies. Inter-cultural hermeneutics can thus 
capitalize on this shared rationality and, through rational comprehension, overcome the 
many cultural obstacles preventing the understanding of the Other(s). 
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